Road crashes involving Hiace vans in Cape Verde by Horta, Gerard, 1962-
83
Gerard Horta: ROAD CRASHES INVOLVING HIACE VANS IN CAPE VERDE
ROAD CRASHES INVOLVING HIACE VANS  
IN CAPE VERDE
Gerard Horta
Abstract: Based on ethnographic research carried out on the islands 
of Santiago and São Vicente in the fall months of 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2014 and 2015, this article analyzes the social universe of interurban 
collective transport in Cape Verde. Its focus is the Toyota Hiace van, 
employed on certain islands of the archipelago since the mid-1980s, 
and it approaches the multi-causality of road crashes involving these 
vehicles through participatory observation made while inside them, 
in addition to conversations and interviews with passengers, former 
passengers, driver-bosses and salaried van drivers, passengers, police 
officers and state transport employees, senior officials and so on. 
Thus, it studies the antagonistic experiences brought on by the use 
of space by motor vehicle drivers, their passengers and pedestrians 
themselves. The different explanations for the causes of road crashes 
fit into the framework of urban transformation processes at work on 
the island, mobility and social dimensions of all kinds: van drivers’ 
working conditions; pavement condition, road signage and lighting; 
the planning of van operation by the public administration; the driving 
supervision by police officers on the roads (or lack thereof), the van’s 
technical conditions; the symbolic status of drivers; road culture and 
motorized driving culture in Cape Verde, etc. In short, all these factors 
interrelate through the daily experience of van travel by Cape Verdeans.
Key words: Cape Verde, Road Crashes, Interurban Transport, Urban 
Planning, Motorization
Vehicle traffic, interurban transport and spatial 
experiences
The large number of factors causing van crashes on Cape Verde 
roads shows the merging of different social processes and the very 
heterogeneous experiences of streets and roads (see an earlier 
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introductory outline in Horta 2013; and the ethnography by Horta and 
Malet 2014). Over and above the public standardizations of vehicle 
traffic, the uses and daily appropriations of space by drivers of all types 
of vehicles and even pedestrians tend to be antagonistic. To understand 
the causes of road crashes we must bear in mind the diverse social 
dimensions that will be referred to in this article: a) first of all, we 
must stress the distinct ways in which space users are represented 
and their patrimonial appropriation of streets and roads (drivers, 
passers-by, peddlers, children, etc. conceive space differently); b) the 
relationship between road crashes and the Hiace ownership system; 
c) the absence of trade unions and civic associations to defend the 
interests of van workers and their passengers; d) the lack of a public 
collective transport organization that truly acts within the many fields 
affecting van operation; e) the fierce competition among van drivers 
for passengers; f) the labor conditions van drivers are subjected to 
(and the relationship between working conditions and alcoholism or 
drug addiction); g) the most wide-ranging technical issues (pavement 
type; lack of signage and lighting; the role of the highway patrol; the 
role of speed bumps; the shift in the center of gravity of vehicles when 
overloaded with passengers or goods, etc.); f) social risk perception 
as regards “good” and “bad” driving; and, finally, g) cultural and 
symbolic van construction.
In Europe and North America, as in Africa, the state bodies adopt 
various types of measures to deal with road crashes, with significantly 
varying degrees. The analyses carried out in Africa with respect 
to accidents and the benefits of road education are from western 
perspectives. These perspectives have been summarized by Buxó 
(2010: 330–336) who distinguishes among technological measures 
(improvement in road infrastructures and signage), regulatory 
ones (laws being rewritten to address road traffic transformations) 
and punitive ones (the penalty-points driving license, fines for not 
wearing seat belts, etc.), as well as awareness campaigns run by public 
bodies and global agencies, (to which one must add the car industry’s 
efforts to improve the safety devices of the vehicles. This Catalan 
anthropologist suggests promoting road culture in public space, and 
cites the example of going through a red light, which, far from being 
a simple infraction, goes against the meaning of democracy. As we see 
it, the debate sparked by this viewpoint reflects the same discussion 
taking place in urban anthropology with respect to the concept of 
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public space as an absolute ideal, yet is too far removed from the 
conflictive dimensions of any hierarchical society.
Buxó sums up the leading causes of accidents with casualties by 
referring basically to distraction, driver inexperience, alcohol and drug 
consumption, fatigue and drowsiness, speeding, rule violations, illegal 
maneuvers, invading the left lane, and road conditions. True, her study 
stems from the analysis of European and North American contexts. If 
we limit ourselves to Cape Verde, we can consider what occurs with 
the broad spectrum of social determinants triggering each factor. By 
this I mean the precarious nature of the van drivers’ employment; 
apathy by the public administration to road maintenance by both 
the State and foreign companies; the high level of competitiveness 
among drivers in a context of poverty, and the lack of passengers… 
Now then, can “civic learning” succeed in a social framework where 
most van drivers withstand a situation of exploitation that gives rise 
to all types of anomic driving styles? To paraphrase Davis (1993), how 
can we strike a balance between the safety of some (motor vehicle 
drivers and passengers) and their potential for endangering others 
(those on foot)?
We then look at what we believe to be the most relevant factors of 
traffic accidents on the island of Santiago involving vans, known 
there generically as Hiaces. And let’s keep in mind one detail: Josep 
Coll, a United Nations employee in Cape Verde, told me in Praia, the 
capital city (10/12/2011), that workers on this island have no insurance 
coverage at all should they travel by Hiace. 
Multi-causality of road crashes involving vans
Classifications of injuries and deaths tend to lump motor vehicle 
injuries into the “accident” category. Here we take the causes of these 
accidents to be material or circumstantial factors –in other words, 
social ones– which increase the possibility of that phenomenon taking 
place (Tapia 1998: 138, based on what Hill established in 1965). If we 
compare motor vehicle mortality rates, these are far more staggering 
in African societies than in their industrialized Western counterparts. 
Statistically speaking, road crashes on this planet kill over 1,200,000 
people annually: 250,000 in 1980; 900,000 in 1990. In April, 2011, 
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the WHO estimated the number of deaths prompted by road crashes 
in Cape Verde in 2010 to be 79 persons –3.71% of the annual deaths– 
and the tenth cause of death, ranking 69th worldwide. According to 
data from the WHO itself (2009), that year there were 267 road crash 
fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles in Cape Verde, 7,900 deaths in 
Rwanda; 7,100 in Mauritania; 3,528.6 in Uganda; 1,239.3 in Sudan; 
1,041.9 in Nigeria; 957 in Angola; 580.6 in Mozambique; 398.6 in 
Morocco; 262.4 in Namibia; 233 in Ghana; 208 in South Africa; 188.4 
in Egypt; 15 in Portugal and in the USA; 10 in Spain; 7 in the United 
Kingdom; and, in other island territories, 1,092.3 in Papua New 
Guinea; 606.1 in the Philippines; 312.2 in Samoa; 226.3 in Cuba; 221.3 
in Sri Lanka; 210.4 in Indonesia; 176.8 in the Bahamas; 106.9 in the 
Seychelles; 65.4 in Jamaica; 64.9 in Barbados; 23.6 in Cyprus; 11 in 
New Zealand; 6.8 in Japan; 5 in Iceland; and 4.6 in Malta.
Compared to other Portuguese-speaking areas –where Hiace use is 
customary in interurban collective transport– and to other island 
contexts, it seems that the Cape Verde data are not the most alarming. 
Nonetheless, we could also discuss the reasons for these accidents 
and, hence, the extent to which many could be avoided. Decades ago, 
Smeed (1974), followed by scholars such as Adams (1985), related 
the percentage of road crashes to the greater or lesser degree of 
motorization. Indeed, if the morality rate per vehicle for Rwanda or 
Mauritania were the same in the USA or the United Kingdom, then 
millions of people would die there every year.
Moreover, when analyzing the reasons for the road crash rate, we 
are not helped in the slightest by its “medicalization” –which is to 
say, the social phenomenon of road crashes being understood as an 
illness, plague, epidemic, trauma, pathology, anxiety or pandemic. 
The quantitative epidemiological literature on road crashes is as far 
removed from our approach as it is futile in terms of prevention: indeed 
the list would be unending. The scant epidemiological contribution to 
awareness of the relationships between a specific society and its way of 
tackling urban renewal, motorization and road crashes is compensated 
by certain studies with greater heuristic openness. See, for example, 
the analyses by Verrips and Meyer (2001), Mutongi (2006), Gewald, 
Luning and Walraven (2009), Klaeger (2009, 2012 and 2013), Kalikiti 
(2010) or Lamont (2010, 2012 and 2013). See also Horta and Malet 
87
Gerard Horta: ROAD CRASHES INVOLVING HIACE VANS IN CAPE VERDE
(2014) for a territorialized compilation of the studies on a driving 
culture, vehicle motorization, road crashes and roads in Africa.
From a qualitative standpoint, Ramos (2011: 9) asks whether 
pathologies associated with road trauma are on a par with those 
produced by war trauma, and proves the different ways in which they 
are injected into processes of human subjectification. What’s more, 
Melnick (2010), like so many other investigators, alerts us to the 
World Health Organization and the World Bank’s growing interest in 
road crashes in “developing” countries. Lamont (2010: 4; and 2013) 
sees a worrying process of medicalization in this attention –“epidemic 
on wheels”, “disease of development”– which really distracts us from 
causalities linked to material want and inequality. It also means that 
Africa is still viewed as a sickly, endangered continent which must 
be rescued –yet again– by the healing and rationalizing virtues of 
western (colonial) powers. In contrast with the latter, Harvey and 
Knox’s ethnographies (2011) on road construction in Peru, and 
Dalakoglou’s (2010) on the border between Albania and Greece, 
analyze the interpenetration of socio-cultural “modes” or “codes” for 
preventing road crashes.
According to the Direcção-Geral de Transportes Rodoviários (Directorate-
General of Road Transport), lawsuits involving road crashes in Cape 
Verde in which Hiaces are recognized to be at fault show the following 
figures throughout the archipelago. For the period of 2006–2011: 56 
(2006), 52 (2007), 68 (2008), 52 (2009), 34 (2010) and 24 (2011). 
Of these 286 cases, 18 occurred on the Barlavento (northern) islands 
and 268 on the Sotavento (southern) islands. The total cost came to 
30,423,583 escudos. According to data from the very DGTR, Hiaces 
were damaged in 389 accidents in the 2005–2011 period.
The more or less recurring modes of accidents involving Hiaces in 
recent years are as follows: a little boy struck by a Hiace coming from 
Txada São Filipe at top speed, resulting in the fracturing of both his 
legs (A Semana 2011); a young bicyclist fatally hit one Sunday night 
–pedestrians and drivers alike consume more alcohol on weekends 
(A Semana 2010); two persons injured after a head-on collision 
between a Hiace and a motorcycle when the Hiace abruptly U-turned 
right in the middle of the road (Notícias do Norte 2011); one dead 
and two seriously injured after the vehicle toppled 20 meters down 
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a ravine (Notícias do Norte 2011a); a little girl killed while crossing the 
road at a curve (A Semana 2011a); a little boy struck after a collision 
between a Hiace and a taxi (A Semana 2011); the hit-and-run death 
of a 50-year-old man at the Somada turnoff towards São Miguel, 
at 10 p.m., although the driver was apprehended the next day in 
Cadjeta (Inforpress 2011); 13 injured –three seriously– when the 
Hiace overturned at a curve, supposedly owing to mechanical failure 
(A Semana 2012b); one seriously injured and 15 only slightly in a crash 
between a Hiace and a taxi (A Semana 2012); a passenger injured after 
the vehicle overturned and veered off the road (Notícias do Norte 
2012); one little girl fatally hit while crossing the street in Tchon Bon 
–then dragged 30 meters by the speeding Hiace – and another killed 
in Picos, when the Hiace driver darted backwards without warning 
(A Semana 2012c); a passenger seriously injured after a Hiace crash 
(Inforpress 2012); a man knocked down one Saturday night when 
crossing the road in Cruz Grande –between Txada Lém and Somada– 
with the impact hurtling the body more than seven yards (A Semana 
2012d); a late-night head-on collision between a motorcycle, whose 
driver died and passenger was seriously injured, and a Hiace, whose 
driver and the woman accompanying him were slightly hurt; in fact 
that same weekend four more drivers were taken to court for road 
traffic violations: two for drunk driving, another for assaulting a police 
agent and finally yet another for running a person over (A Semana 
2012e); the running over of a 38-year-old woman in Santa Catarina 
who was crossing the road (A Semana 2012f); the deadly hitting of 
a 71-year-old man –on February 21, 2009, with the trial being delayed 
three years –, due to a blowout according to the driver, yet to the Hiace’s 
high speed according to the plaintiff (A Semana 2012g); a 41-year-old 
man fatally struck in Txada Tenda at dusk, when the driver accelerated 
while performing parking maneuvers, running over the pedestrian 
opposite him; a Hiace careening into a man in Tchon Bon (A Semana 
2012h) –six months later, the guilty driver was sentenced to two 
years and six months of prison and ordered to pay 500,000 escudos 
($5,000) to the victim’s family (A Semana 2013); eleven injured –
with varying degrees of seriousness– when a parked Hiace’s brakes 
failed, while the driver was fixing a battery problem, causing it to 
fall down a ravine (Cabo Verde Directo 2013). This selection of news 
items summarizes the predominant typology of van crashes. We can 
confirm an elevated rate of pedestrians struck down, many of whom 
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were children. Ultimately, walking along the roads poses a daily risk 
to all of them (for a panoramic study of this terrain, see Tapia (1998); 
for an analysis of spatially segregating drivers from pedestrians, see 
Buxó (2006: 50–51). Moreover, it has been seen that a serious van 
accident is usually a matter of the greater the passenger load, the 
deadlier the consequences. The majority of van drivers in accidents 
were young, some without a license and many of them under the 
influence of alcohol –especially during working hours and on weekend 
nights. Bicyclists are another type of victim (although there are very 
few on Cape Verde roads), as are motorcyclists and naturally the van 
passengers themselves. There are times when van technical failures 
triggered by problems with the brake system are blamed. Nonetheless, 
overturned vehicles –and head-on collisions– tend to be the result of 
bad driving, pure and simple.
Trials and driver convictions have been on a gradual upswing in 
Cape Verde: what in the past was apt to conclude now and then, if at 
all, with mere court declarations, over time has drawn more severe 
punishment by the legal authorities, who, should they discover the 
accused to be driving without a license, are more inclined to hand 
down prison sentences. 
If vans are involved in the vast majority of accidents on the roads of 
Santiago –where many more vans than automobiles travel–, in urban 
contexts the proportion is more even. A study has established that 98% 
of traffic accidents in Praia involve vans and taxis (A Semana 2012a). 
And yet it never ceases to amaze how scant the media coverage of van 
crashes is in relation to their empiric involvement.
What’s more, although accidents and incidents of varying degrees of 
seriousness take place every day –Lamont (2012) terms this process 
“industrial catastrophe” in his study on Kenya–, rarely is there any 
media follow-up. Safety campaigns are very sporadic, limited, for 
example, to van supervision during major celebrations, whether 
local or highly traditional –such as Christmas and New Year’s–, or on 
summer weekends, especially in order to administer the breathalyzer 
test (Expresso das Ilhas 2012; 2012a). In the first two weeks of 
November, 2013, the DGTR and the National Police announced an 
increase in the oversight of illegal transport of people in pickup trucks 
–Toyota Hiluxes– owing to recent crashes, with fatal victims included.
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As for the DGTR, in late 2013 its director-general João José de Pina 
assured that in the immediate future the police would be very strict 
with regard to failure to comply with established traffic regulations, 
planting responsibility on Hilux drivers –and the very culture of Cape 
Verdean people–, who, he claimed, were fully aware of the risk to which 
they were subjecting so many. Pina referred to accidents prompted by 
the Hilux as “a devastating evil on our roads”, and recalled the Cape 
Verde government’s goal to reduce the road crash rate by 50% until 
2020. In the same month of November, 2013 the government decreed 
the annual commemoration, every November 30, of “Dia da Segurança 
Rodoviária” (Road Vehicle Safety Day) with the aim of making drivers, 
pedestrians and users –which is to say passengers– aware of the 
dangers lurking on the roads (A Semana 2013b).
Some days later –11/18/2013– the WHO’s Cape Verde office issued 
a press release reporting on the “Marcha em memoria às víctimas dos 
acidentes rodoviários” (March in Memory of Vehicle Accident Victims) 
held hours before in Praia. The silent march (yet not entirely: in the 
midst of it journalists questioned Pina as director of the DGTR) was 
organized by the Ministério da Administração Interna and the DGTR as 
a tribute to road crash victims and to promote worldwide road safety 
(traffic accidents are the world’s leading cause of death among young 
people of 15 to 29 years of age, and provoke millions of injuries every 
year, something that “overloads” public health services). Behind Pina 
were representatives of the police, driving schools, the Ministerio da 
Educação, civil defense services, the WHO, etc., with the presence 
of elementary school teachers and pupils. The march concluded at 
a sports arena with a simulation of first aid services to an accident 
victim by a Civil Defense officer –surrounded by four people– while 
hundreds of students watched the exercise. Those heading the march 
carried a banner which invoked: “Mortes na estrada. Vamos travar este 
drama! Dia Mundial em memoria das víctimas da violencia no trânsito” 
(“Road deaths. Let’s stop this drama. International Day in memory of 
victims of traffic violence”). For his part, José Gonçalves, an expert on 
prevention and road education –and owner of a driving school– raised 
the awareness of his students, who were entrusted with conveying the 
aims of the event to parents, family members and friends: to console 
surviving victims and the families of the dead, and to call on youths, 
particularly drivers, to modify their traffic behavior.
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On the other hand, the scope of treatment of victims of accidents, their 
hospitalization, rehabilitation, labour and social reintegration, and 
the role of the courts has been developed in Horta and Malet (2014: 
216–23). We interviewed victims, a Supreme Court worker, members 
of Cape Verde’s two largest insurance companies, and hiace drivers. 
Unfortunately, the conclusions are demoralizing: beyond the hospital 
emergency, the abandonment of the victims by the State is obvious. 
The victims do not have the possibility of counting in the medium and 
long term with public aid, and even less with the private one. Their 
battle after the accident consists in overcoming, individually and 
collectively, the misfortune experienced. The dispersion of survivors 
prevents collective judicial proceedings. In addition, the situation of 
extreme economic precariousness of the majority of the victims and 
of disinformation explains that no judicial proceedings are taken.
Reasons for road crashes involving vans
In addition to speeding, passenger overload and drunk driving, there 
are other reasons for van accidents which we will now address. The 
order is unrelated to their degree of importance, given the synchronic 
superposition of factors that prompt road crashes on Cape Verde roads.
The first, one of the leading causes of van crashes, and almost 
systematically overlooked in all types of road crash studies, is the 
fierce competition among van drivers –particularly non-owners– in 
the area from Somada to Praia. The high seasonal instability of this 
line of work means that one van will have several drivers, and this 
creates chronic uncertainty and stress for them. It is compounded by 
precarious wage and working conditions: the general pattern does not 
cover driver sick leave (something which depends on each individual 
boss’s decision) or vacations (should they even enter the picture), and 
the workdays are very intense. All this raises the pressing need to make 
as many trips as possible, thus accounting for the breakneck speed 
of many vans and the driving risks taken along sometimes deficient 
road infrastructures.
Far fewer accidents take place in the areas areas of Cadjeta in the 
northeast of Santiago and Tarrafal in the north. This is because in 
those parts of the island van drivers usually own their vehicles and 
drive much more responsibly, free from the van bosses’ endless 
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pressure on their salaried drivers. Most accidents accumulate on the 
outskirts of Praia, where there is high vehicle transit and the drivers 
are salaried employees with poor labor conditions. In the area between 
Praia (in the south of the island) and Somada (in the center), there is 
staggering competition among drivers to obtain passengers and reach 
the destination quickly so as to embark on a new journey as soon as 
possible in order to satisfy the urge to earn, since they must pay the 
van bosses a pre-established amount of the daily profits. In a nutshell, 
the types of vehicle ownership and their link with working conditions 
clearly affect the way driving is undertaken.
Pavement conditions provide a second reason: many roads are made 
of cobblestones, following the Portuguese colonial model imposed on 
Cape Verdeans for 400 years. Despite the everyday presence of working 
men and woman walking along the shoulders, the roads are in poor 
condition in certain areas, especially in the mountains, where fallen 
rocks caused by irregular rainfall on this island have to be removed. 
Furthermore, the physical geography characteristic of a volcanic 
island like Santiago, with uneven terrain and numerous precipices, 
intensifies this propensity for accidents. Historically speaking, the 
abysmal pavement quality has led to countless situations in which, in 
an effort to avoid a bump, drivers invade the other lane, thus causing 
the worst accidents –head-on collisions– time and time again. Even 
though from 2009 to 2013 the main routes of Santiago were asphalted 
–not so on islands like Santo Antão (A Semana 2013a)–, how can one 
deny the dismal paradox that the higher pavement quality enables 
drivers to go faster yet, thus reaping an even more deadly crop of 
accidents)? The asphalted pavement of the main arteries thus appears 
to be a paradoxical incentive for greater speed as a risk factor.
A third aspect, linked to the second, is the lack of signage on the 
old roads: not only in the marking of continuous or broken lines on 
the surface, but also in the shortage of regulation signals, including 
traffic lights in populated centers and above all at access points. We 
have already referred to the issue of lack of maintenance of the scant 
signals –there are only two traffic lights in Tarrafal, a town of 10,000 
inhabitants, which forces anyone wishing to get their driving license 
to do so in Somada, where there are more. In parallel fashion, road 
lighting is non-existent: Delcia, a municipal architect in Tarrafal, 
revealed how, one night years before, her father accidently slammed 
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into and killed a dark cow. It is true that in the immediate future roads 
are to be gradually repaved throughout the island, and that the asphalt 
will be marked with continuous and broken lines. Will this mean meek 
obedience to such a graphic expression of road standardization? Not at 
all. Visionary indeed was the following exemplification of automobile 
behavior that Lévi-Strauss (1990: 670) called for so as to question 
the false conviction of so many anthropologists with respect to the 
supposed centrality of affectivity in ritual:
Besides, all these commentators, who see the emotional aspect of 
ritual as being central to it, and who expatiate on the anguish created 
by taboos, make one think irresistible of some anthropologist from 
another planet who, in his monograph on Earth-dwellers, might 
describe the superstitious terror which prevents motorists from 
crossing the symbolic limit marked simply by a line along the road, 
and even from infringing the taboo ever so slightly; he might also give 
a horrifying account of the penalty, which is collision with another 
vehicle… But we have no feelings of this kind; we respect the white 
line as part of our everyday routine without attributing any emotional 
value to it.
A fourth reason would be the dearth of police control along roads and 
in areas most worthy of the term “high risk”. In their everyday routine 
the police do not supervise drivers in any stringent manner, either 
on the roads or in the towns –except in major operations prompted 
by the celebration of festivals drawing people from different towns. 
A police officer tends to work where he lives, where he has his friends 
and family. And in small towns and villages almost everyone ends up 
being someone’s friend or family member, meaning that traffic rules 
are not enforced firmly enough. Senior police officers and ordinary 
traffic agents alike complain that they lack the sufficient technical and 
human means. Some drivers and passengers refer to a generalized 
practice by many policemen: the laxness of many agents with respect to 
traffic involving vehicles whose owners are themselves police officers 
or state officials. This has to do not only with keeping one’s license 
up-to-date but also passenger overload itself. However, certain van 
overload situations are experienced by many passengers as a show of 
solidarity by drivers. Passengers make special reference to vans that 
leave at night being the last possible vehicle available for reaching 
one’s destination. The absence of interurban collective public transport 
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makes dependence on the van absolute. In the end, the police take 
on the supervisory role which the population itself should play with 
regard to van drivers.
A fifth reason, central to road crashes, has to do with the previously 
mentioned fact that vans cut through countless villages, whose 
residents, above all boys, girls and animals –goats, dogs, chickens, 
pigs, even cows–, spend time on and walk along that same road 
which the vans cross, often at top speed. Roberto, an architect with 
the Câmara Municipal do Tarrafal (Municipal Chamber of Tarrafal), 
told us one morning in November, 2010 that he saw a car hit a cow. 
The residents occupy each village’s central streets, now transformed 
into thoroughfares, as extensions of their homes. Here one must 
stress the extent to which risk perception differs from one social and 
urban-planning context to another. As Ramos points out in reference 
to Addis Ababa (2010), the social evaluation of pedestrians’ rights is 
very low: the cognitive distance between drivers and pedestrians, in 
terms of spatial experience, interpretation and adaptation, is vast; 
and the negotiation or struggle for space, intense. See Fiori (2010) 
for Bamako; and Choplin (2010) and Alonso and Nucci (2011) for 
Nouakchott.
Bestard (1996: 11–16) highlights the crucial role played by Mary 
Douglas (1996 [1985]) in suggesting the inseparable link between 
risk perception and the social building of value judgments as a means 
for controlling social norms and, thus, as a category through which 
the ever-changing evaluations of a society are established with 
respect to its certainties and uncertainties. No human being is free 
of “cultural prejudices” and, in this regard, social representations 
are dynamically revealed though people’s social experiences –social 
situations, processes and structuralizations. Indeed such concepts 
come to mind as risk society, (Beck 1992) –owing to the technological 
changes in transport methods– and the surmounting of this very risk 
by their spatial, temporal and social limits (Beck 1995), exemplified in 
a situation as simple as the sale in Europe of a second-hand Hiace in 
poor condition, which would see its precarious driving life prolonged 
on the roads of Santiago.
Within this context, we see the curious paradox put forth by Moreira 
(2011: 87–97) in her analysis of the relationship between risk 
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perception and accident accumulation zones (AAZ) in Portugal. 
Smeed (1974) relates the increase in risk behavior by motor vehicles 
to improved infrastructure and technologies. Bellaby (1990), on 
the other hand, believes that discipline in vehicle driving behavior 
exists when drivers are accustomed to coexisting in an environment 
of motor traffic density. Even Adams (1995) refers to a reduction in 
road crashes as a response to increased risk perception. And Wilde 
(1994) postulates, from a homeostatic or self-regulating viewpoint, 
that collective risk management mechanisms work as a thermostat, 
tending towards an “optimum” tolerable risk based on the adjustment 
of driving behavior: reckless driving as opposed to careful driving.
Well and good. After tracing different ethnographical interrelations at 
black points on Lisbon’s streets and avenues, Moreira draws attention 
to new urban planning experiences in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
where immense uncertainty is being deliberately implemented in 
places where cars, trucks, cyclists and pedestrians converge, since 
artificial traffic regulation has been replaced by everyday standards 
of social interaction. This has brought greater awareness of existing 
dangers, which has in turn led to fewer serious accidents without 
affecting the traffic flow (Moreira 2011: 94). What is being advocated 
is, in some way, the social exercise of pedestrian self-organization –or 
self-management, both pedestrian (Lincoln and Schenkei 1974) and 
motorized, in all kinds of contexts worldwide, without the need for 
traffic signage or lights, as can be seen, say, in the urban contexts 
of India and so many cities in Asia, the Caribbean, America, Africa. 
Nonetheless, there will always be those who, conceiving social 
disorganization as “the decrease of the influence of existing social 
rules of behavior upon individual members of the group” –according to 
W.I. Thomas’s definition applied by Hannerz (1993 [1980]: 33)–, 
understand in such a particular way not so much the need to repress 
a pedestrian through the application of a reinvented highway code, 
as pedestrian self-organization as a danger that must be assuaged.
Applied to the sphere of motor vehicles, we find the singular political 
challenge by the Catalan anarcho-syndical organization Confederació 
Nacional del Treball (National Labor Confederation) (CNT), which 
in the revolutionary Barcelona of 1936, proposed abolishing traffic 
lights in favor of collective self-management of traffic on city streets. 
What is significant about the enormous self-organizational capacity of 
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pedestrians as opposed to the overall battle by automobile drivers for 
space, subjected to strict traffic regulations? What is lost on the path 
that leads from pedestrian to driver? What hinders the perpetuation of 
that everyday behavioral self-management? Why do cars collide when 
pedestrians do not? In a different context, insomuch as vehicle traffic 
density was negligible in 1936 compared to the present, the Catalan 
anarchists sought to galvanize that tremendous capacity for self-
organization of people in the streets to the dimension of relationships 
among automobile drivers. The idea was once again to abolish, the 
mediation figures: in this case, traffic lights.
Returning to our account, it might be worthwhile to add a sixth and 
eminently technical reason, which relates different fields: passenger 
and/or goods overload. The first public complaint recorded on 
this issue was voiced 30 years ago by Mário G. Fernandes in an in-
depth report (La Voz di Povo 1985). The text is accompanied by the 
photograph of the rear of a Hilux packed with passengers, with three 
men precariously seated on the rear door, legs dangling from the 
vehicle. Even at this early stage, mention was made that the Datsun 
and Peugeot 404 pickup trucks for transporting passengers and goods 
were designed to hold a maximum load of 900 kg. This limit, Fernandes 
argued, was exceeded on countless occasions, since regular passenger 
overload can mean cramming 18 people –with an average weight 
of 75 kg per head, reaching 1,350 kg. This affects both the vehicle’s 
technical structure, reducing its capacity, and the shift in its center of 
gravity, which, say in curves, can bring about fatal consequences. In 
view of such a situation, Fernandes advocated setting a load limit of 13 
passengers, although this proved insufficient, as we will soon discover.
Since 1967, the Hiace model has been designed to take more and more 
passengers: first 12, then 15, and later 18 for the new models. More 
than once we have witnessed 25 to 30 people –including children or 
babies–, and often these people will add their own load –as is the case 
of fishmongers or other types of vendors–, which tends to accumulate 
in the second and back rows. Such a phenomenal and unquestionably 
disproportionate load change in a Hiace produces a substantial shift 
in the vehicle’s center of gravity, contrasting sharply to the initial 
determination of a center of gravity intended for a much smaller 
load. Many younger drivers are unaware of this and the results are 
disastrous: any sudden slamming of the brakes or U-turns will cause 
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the load being transported to shift –and/or the same alteration in 
the center of gravity which the vehicle experiences under these 
circumstances– can have potentially fatal consequences.
A seventh reason, just as technical and closely related to the previous 
ones, has to do with the fact that, given the lukewarm police 
supervision and precarious presence of traffic lights and manual 
signaling, speed bumps are the only devices on the roads of Santiago 
and throughout Cape Verde able to calm vehicle speed. A speed bump 
may be described as the abrupt change in the pavement’s longitudinal 
profile with the concave part facing upwards, called in Portuguese 
quebramolas (literally, “suspension breakers”). These curved elevations 
in the pavement extend right across the width of certain points in the 
road. Also made of cobblestones, Cape Verde speed bumps are unlike 
some of those found in Europe, at least the better built ones, which are 
manufactured with softer materials and form winding elevations yet 
not as violently pronounced, and graphically distinguished with bright 
colors with respect to the chromatic continuum of the pavement, 
which is gray at all times.
Despite the fact that drivers usually know where the speed bumps 
lurk, a simple distraction caused by fatigue or speeding, combined 
with, say, reduced vision at night –due to the non-existence of public 
lighting at the towns’ entrances and exits or at junctions where the 
speed bumps are installed – are enough to create a context apt to lead 
to an accident.
In an attempt to dodge the speed bumps, many drivers swerve in such 
a way as to cross them diagonally so that the wheels need not pass 
over the elevation in a pavement which, let’s not forget, is built with 
cobblestones, always on the shoulder of the part of the road where 
the vehicle is traveling, which is to say on the right. Or, in the case 
of asphalt pavements, the speed bumps occupy only one’s own lane, 
so that the driver invades the opposite lane, veering diagonally to 
the left so that at least one wheel is spared the “exertion”. The most 
frequent damage occurs to the wheels, suspension and steering, as 
both drivers and mechanics attest. In fact, Barley (1983) refers – in his 
fieldwork in the Dowayo country, in Cameroon– to a primary precedent 
of speed bumps located at both ends of a bridge as the mainspring of 
countless accidents.
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The eighth cause is undoubtedly the high volume of the music that 
accompanies the itinerary, since it drowns out sound signals by 
other vehicles or alerts by passengers who wish to get off at the most 
unsuspected spots. Is it a question of scale? Buxó (2010: 337) relates 
automatisms such as music –and the imaginative induction of speed– 
with movement. This facilitates the loss of the causal connection, 
appearance and reality blend, and an extremely sensory identification 
with the environment takes place. Driving along the road resembles 
a cinematic displacement: sequences, scenes and plans follow each 
other while the person tense connections and disconnections between 
things and acts:
Control over one’s attention is deactivated while automatisms invade 
the stimuli and this much needed control ceases to be exerted. As long 
as road contingencies produce lines, tie-ups and other annoyances, we 
see transgressions from the norms and imprudence such as running 
traffic lights, passing and failure to maintain the safety distance. 
And if the conditions are repeated on a daily basis, the driver uses 
the distraction as a compensatory mechanism, since, because one 
cannot advance and nothing else can be done, the alternative is to 
seek distractions in order to surmount situations of desperation and 
irritation. These include radio talk shows, music, note-taking, talking 
on the cell phone or dictating into a tape recorder, activities that 
expand the car’s usefulness in terms of entertainment and getting the 
most out of space-time. As always, the dose is fundamental. In the form 
of a homeopathic medicine, minimum doses of distraction are reflex 
reactivators, as are road signs, which call attention to drowsiness and 
fatigue, although certainly give secondary importance to the necessary 
tension between attention and lack of attention.
When seeking verisimilitude in comparing the states of the souls 
of humans and animals, Lévi-Strauss (1990: 683–84) reflected with 
precision on the implications of motorized driving as being both 
fascinating in that it opens doors to new social universes and fatal 
because it leads to the cemetery or to suffering:
A man accustomed to driving a car controls this supplementary power 
by means of a nervous system adapted to the more modest function of 
controlling his body. We see here, the, the same disproportion as in 
the animal between a symbolic faculty whose capacity for synthesis is 
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remarkably limited in relationship to the problems that it may have to 
solve, and the enormous physical resources available for the solution 
of the problems.
A man is driving at speed along an open road; there is nothing 
special to attract his attention; he falls into a state blissful, 
dreamy absentmindedness and trusts to his automatic reactions 
as an experienced driver for the carrying out of slight and precise 
movements that he no longer need control consciously, since they 
have become second nature to him. But if suddenly, some object that 
he has carelessly thrown on to the seat and forgotten about, falls out 
of place, producing and unexpected noise that cannot be confused 
with the hum of the engine or the familiar vibrations of the car body, 
his attention is immediately alerted, his muscles begin to tense, his 
whole being is seized with feverish anxiety through fear of some 
incomprehensible mishap that could in a fraction of a second, lead to 
disaster. In no less short a time, his mind reels off the list of possible 
explanations, his defense mechanisms spring into action and his 
memory is called upon to function: the effects is then linked with its 
cause, and the occurrence is understood as the insignificant matter 
it is. It was nothing of any importance, and yet, for a moment, the 
nervous system of an ordinary human body has had to cope with the 
risks inherent in the enormous surplus of power bestowed on it by 
the engine. One sometimes reads in the newspapers that drivers, at 
the wheel, behave like animals; as can be seen, there is another sense 
too, an intellectual not a moral one, in which the use of a machine 
produced by human inventiveness, paradoxically takes man back to 
the animal condition: his symbolic capacity, although incomparably 
greater than that of an animal, is, as it were, minimized by his being 
in charge of an artificial body whose physical power is far in excess of 
that of his natural body. It is in such a situation, which has nothing to 
do with ritual, that the messages become improverished, schematic 
and discontinuous, and call for an all-or-nothing answer.
A ninth and fundamental cause of road crashes lies in the very 
guidelines of social road conduct prevalent among certain Hiace van 
drivers, or what could be called “bad driving” by excellent drivers. 
These drivers literally stop wherever they like, even just beyond 
an extremely rare traffic sign prohibiting just that: stopping. The 
widespread disorder results in tie-ups in the midst of a road trip, 
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usually produced by a pedestrian flagging down the vehicle in the 
hopes of boarding or because a passenger informs the driver, with 
next to no warning, of the spot where he or she wishes to get off. As 
a passenger I have witnessed both situations on dozens of occasions. 
With respect to the prevailing driving styles, it is eye-opening indeed 
that the driver should halt just after a very tight curve, placing his 
occupants very much in harm’s way, regardless of his good intentions 
of picking up or dropping off a passenger. On a 110-minute trip –Praia-
Tarrafal–, I have observed stops right in the middle of the road, twice 
with considerable backing up included. Another example is the overall 
failure to use seat belts, even though the driver, passengers under 12 
years of age and those in the front row are obliged by law to do so.
As the tenth cause, in certain cases this “bad driving” can be related 
to daily alcohol consumption by young salaried drivers, which, like 
the fish that bites its own tail, takes us back to our starting point: the 
tremendous labor pressure that salaried drivers are under sometimes 
leads to drinking on the job. This does not in any way facilitate 
reasonable van driving, and without a doubt must be contextualized 
in the cultural role played by consumption of grogue –distilled sugar 
cane within reach of the popular social majority – in Cape Verde. It 
is there where the property system, more specifically that which is 
encountered for the most part in Praia and Somada, is recognized as 
a core element in triggering generalized high-risk situations.
The eleventh and final reason is that a considerable number of the 
vehicles are second-hand ones purchased in the Netherlands or the 
Canary Islands. The vehicle’s wear and tear during its ownership brings 
with it a series of deficiencies made more severe with the passing of 
time, which on occasion become another reason for accidents to occur. 
Bear in mind that the technical maintenance of the vehicle and official 
Hiace van inspections are rather slapdash.
Returning to Fernandes’s text (1985), where does he believe attention 
should focus as regards methods for as regards proposing methods 
for reducing road crash intensity? In seven points: 1) more exacting 
standards when testing future drivers; 2) limiting the right to drive 
automobiles with more than four passengers to drivers with at least 
one year of proven experience; 3) in addition to the preceding point, 
truck and Hiace van drivers must pass a complementary exam; 4) 
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the maximum number of passengers to be transported by truck and 
Hiace van must be in line with the transportation capacity and box 
size of each vehicle; 5) specialized technical teams, with appropriate 
equipment must see to the inspection of all vehicles running on 
Cape Verde roads, with the aim of pinpointing mainly problems with 
the brakes, transmission, steering, power supply, regulation and 
focalization of lighting…, and just as ordinary vehicles should undergo 
a yearly inspection, those employed for passenger transport should 
have to pass the tests twice yearly; 6) the visible placing of traffic signs 
and signals on roads and urban streets, at a height of at least 1.5 m and 
made from adequate material –in a display of admirable propositional 
astuteness, and in view of the empirical basis of his recommendations, 
he proposed replacing the galvanized pipes used to make signs and 
signals with reinforced concrete as a deterrent to the then widespread 
practice of theft and 7) speed limit on roads with the help of the police 
and proper traffic signage.
The fact that almost 30 years ago a mechanical automobile engineer 
like Fernandes would be alerting the public to issues such aspects as 
passenger overload, technical inspection of Hiluxes and Hiaces, the 
regulatory role of the police and the lack of traffic signage confirms how 
stubbornly real life takes over government plans that are agonizingly 
slow in their application, if applied at all. What is paradoxical about 
the case is that Fernandes himself became director of the DGTR in 
the 1990s and nothing changed with respect to what he himself had 
protested so strongly about in 1985.
On Sunday, November 28, 2010, a Hiace van rammed into another 
car near Somada killing a female passenger, people got out of their 
vehicles, some weeping… The road crash data for Cape Verde for the 
year 2009 set the figure as 3,500 accidents, with 900 persons injured 
and 60 dead –79 in 2010. Parallel to road crashes is the endemic lack of 
health care. Takota, a former military officer now retired (11/14/2010), 
looks back on an accident that took place near Tchon Bon in 2006: 
a truck literally crushed a Hiace with nine people aboard, four from 
a single family. All were killed. At that time there were no civil defense 
teams, such as firefighters to cut through the wreckage and rescue the 
victims, or mobile units to tend to the injured onsite. 
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Takota also recalls a festive Sunday in Tarrafal, when the Praça da Igreja 
was the setting for a car crash rescue simulation: eleven civil defense 
and firefighting vehicles took part, and one ambulance, in addition 
to 30 members of the police, firefighters and civil defense employees. 
The operation was supervised by three Portuguese police officers. The 
simulation of the accident in a certain way reenacted the accident that 
had taken place in 2006, when different cooperation agencies began 
to acquire fire engines for the island. The day of the exhibition the 
local firefighters did not convey a great sense of self-assurance, or 
perhaps they were simply very nervous on account of the supervision 
and the presence of the congregated public. They gripped the vehicle’s 
roof and proceeded to open it like a can. Next a fireman played the 
role of the injured party so that he could be evacuated from inside in 
accordance with the protocols. The vehicle was then set on fire and 
rapidly extinguished with foam, to showcase the firefighters’ prowess. 
The onlookers grimaced at the ineptitude of Cape Verde’s finest.
Given the Hiace van’s prominent role in road accidents, there is 
a series of concomitant factors depending on different experiences 
that must be kept in mind. First off, demands by the drivers, including 
driver-bosses, are futile. Nor is there a Hiace passengers association, 
meaning that any type of action taken regarding the organization of 
Hiace van transport is up to the public administrations. Something 
as simple as the lack of reliable transit scheduling leaves passengers 
utterly dependent on circumstance, obliged all too often to turn up at 
the departure spots well ahead of time, and more so when the trip is 
a long one, since it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy 
how long the trip will take. We have to remember that passenger-driver 
agreements are what ensure a certain trust in punctual departures 
and arrivals. In fact, the places pre-established as departure and 
arrival points for Hiace vans are not even properly set up, meaning 
that passengers often have to endure a long wait under the blazing 
Central African sun or withstand the sand-bearing easterly wind from 
the continent, without so much as a shelter or a bench. This is why the 
passengers’ own experience can seem paradoxical, since at times it is 
they themselves who urge the driver to go faster. So what parameters 
is social risk control based on?
And yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that the working and 
wage conditions of salaried Hiace van drivers are higher than those of 
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most of the working population; and too that being a Hiace driver is 
a source prestige, given its prominent social relevance. Regardless of 
the types of relationships this phenomenon may give rise to between 
the driver and female passengers – romantic and sexual, consented 
or negotiated –, the experience of certain young drivers as little road 
gods heightens the frequency of risk situations –greater commitments, 
faster speed– or simply situations of abysmal service: stopping to drink 
grogu, or else halting to comply with requests for a tryst by a girlfriend 
who lives somewhere along the route (the latter perhaps now unusual, 
common enough if we look back in time, and which entails a broad 
spectrum of possibilities in terms of the empirical connotations of 
the encounter).
Most of our sources –drivers and residents of different small towns 
and villages – are quick to point out that 2008 marked the beginning 
of a slump in passenger volume. This palpable crisis is due to the 
fact that many cannot nor need not travel, owing to unemployment. 
The effects of this process directly affect the length of working days 
and the conditions under which the trips are carried out. The drivers 
are trapped between the need to make the trip cost-effective –which 
depends on the number of passengers transported– and the increased 
amount of time recruiting passengers –and the waiting time for those 
already aboard the vehicle, which in the case of departure from Praia, 
at midday or in the afternoon, can be up to two hours, or one hour 
from Tarrafal to Praia in the morning. This decrease would explain the 
intensified competition between Hiace van and taxi drivers in Praia 
and at its international airport. Moreover, the increase in vans on the 
road in recent years has only exacerbated the gravity of the situation. 
Conclusion
The causes of road crashes involving Hiace vans in Santiago must 
be placed in the context of the urban transformation processes that 
have been taking place in the island during the last 20 years. We are 
in front of a wide set of interrelated situations and frameworks for 
interpretation and action. All of which is cast in the vehicle traffic on 
the roads of Santiago and, to a greater or lesser degree, on the whole 
of Cape Verde.
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In this context, several social dimensions must be examined. To 
begin with, the public normativisation of vehicle traffic does not 
mechanically match neither the uses and daily appropriations by 
drivers of all types of vehicles, nor the uses and appropriations of space 
by pedestrians on the roads. On the other hand, there is an explicit 
relationship between the accident rate and the Hiace ownership 
system, particularly concerning the labor conditions of van drivers, 
and, in some cases, the consumption of alcohol or drugs. In the area 
from Praia to Somada, the fierce competition for passengers among 
Hiace van drivers does not favour good driving. In front of this, the 
absence of a true public organisation of collective transport that acts 
within the many domains affecting Hiace vans’ operation is apparent.
Finally, two spheres must be added: firstly, a wide range of technical 
issues (the types of road pavement; the lack of road signage and 
good lighting; the ambiguous role of police on the road; the role of 
speed bumps –the technical design of which has been improved in 
the years 2013 and 2014; the change of the center of mass in vehicles 
overloaded with passengers or commodities; etc.). Secondly, the social 
construction of the perception of risk in relation to “good” and “bad” 
driving must be taken into account, since in many occasions it is the 
passengers’ collective dynamics what motivates the driver to drive 
faster and assume certain risks. In short, these are different aspects 
which cannot be analyzed individually, but must be approached 
through the global interrelation between them.
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